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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARK VII FINANCIAL
CONSULTANTS CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 880606-CA

DALE SMEDLEY and THE FIRST
NATIONAL BANK OF LAYTON,

Category 14b

Defendants-Appellees.

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This is an appeal in a civil case from the Amended Judgment
on the Verdict entered on June 23, 1988, following a jury trial.
(R. 483-85.)
1988.

Plaintiff filed its Notice of Appeal on July 12,

(R. 490-91.)

The Supreme Court had jurisdiction pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (i) (1988).

The Supreme Court

poured this case over to this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2-2(4) on October 19, 1988.

This Court has jurisdiction

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC.
Appellant does not believe that any constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations are determinative of the issues raised herein.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature Of The Case.

This is a civil case for conver-

sion and for breach of contract.

B.

Course Of Proceedings And Disposition Below,

Plain-

tiff filed its Complaint in the Third Judicial District Court of
Salt Lake County on July 31, 1985.

(R. 5-11.)

By stipulation

of the parties, venue of the case was transferred to the Second
Judicial District Court of Davis County.

(R. 2-4.)

filed an Amended Complaint on August 15, 1986.
defendants

each

filed

answers

to

the

Plaintiff

(R. 85-94.)

Amended

The

Complaint.

(Smedley, R. 95-101; First National Bank of Layton, R. 102-07.)
On May 23, 1986, plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. 51-52), and on March 23, 1987, filed a Reviewed

[sic:

Judgment.

Renewed]

and

(R. 113-14.)

Amended

Motion

for

Partial

Summary

The Court thereafter entered an Order

determining that Smedley, who had made a bid on the subject
property at a sale held by the bank, had thereby only redeemed
the property as a secured party and did not take pursuant to
that sale, and that Smedleyfs acquisition of the collateral did
not destroy the ownership interest of the plaintiff.

The court

otherwise denied plaintiff's Motions for Summary Judgment.

(R.

174-75; 177-80.)
The case was tried before a jury on March 30, April 1, and
April 4, 1988.

At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a

verdict, a copy of which is attached hereto in Appendix A,
awarding damages in favor of plaintiff and against Smedley and
the bank for $586.00, and against Smedley only for $30,586.00.
(R. 439-41.)
1988.

A Judgment on Verdict was entered on April 18,

(R. 442-44.)
2

On the same day as the entry of the Judgment on Verdict,
plaintiff filed a Motion for Judgment N.O.V.
Motion

for Judgment

and Interest

(R. 429-31), a

(R. 432-33),

a Motion for

Attorney's Fees and Costs (R. 434-35), and a Motion for a New
Trial or for an Additur.

(R. 436-38.)

augmented

the

in

plaintiff

pre-judgment

judgment

the

interest,

After hearing, the court

amount

of

costs

and

$250.00,

granted

attorney's

fees

against Smedley, and otherwise denied plaintiff's motions.
486-88.)

(R.

An Amended Judgment on the Verdict reflecting the

disposition of plaintiff's post-trial motions was entered on
June 23, 1988.

(R. 483-85.)

Appeal on July 12, 1988.
C.

Plaintiff filed its Notice of

(R. 490-91.)

Statement Of Facts.

The dispute in this case centers

around a 1973 Chicago pneumatic drill rig mounted on a 1973
International truck ("drill rig"), which served as collateral
for a promissory note executed by plaintiff in favor of General
Electric Credit Corporation ("GECC").
guaranteed by defendant Dale Smedley.

Payment of the note was
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 4.)

The transactions that led to the signing of the promissory
note started sometime prior to October, 1983.

Smedley owned

approximately 200 acres of land in Morgan County, Utah, subject
to a mortgage in favor of GECC in the approximate amount of
$112,500.00.

Smedley and plaintiff entered into negotiations

under which the parties would form a joint venture with plaintiff infusing capital and the parties developing the property.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit

1.)

The negotiations culminated
3

in an

agreement

dated

June

8,

1984,

under

which

plaintiff

paid

$100,000.00 cash to GECC and executed a promissory note for the
balance due on the mortgage.
$13,250.00.)

(The promissory note was for

The promissory note was secured by the drill rig

and by the personal guarantee of Smedley.
2; R. 277-78.)

(Plaintiff's Exhibit

Smedley executed a bill of sale to the drilling

rig conveying title to the plaintiff.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 3.)

Smedley, however, had the right to reacquire title to the drill
rig by performing $65,000.00 worth of work towards developing
the 200 acres of real property.
2.)

(R. 278; Plaintiff's Exhibit

Actual possession of the drill rig, however, at all times

remained with Smedley.

(R. 201, 279.)

The promissory note became due on January 1, 1985 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4), and plaintiff did not make the payment.
279.)

(R.

At the request of Smedley, the First National Bank of

Layton ("bank") purchased the position of GECC in the promissory
note, chattel mortgage and guaranty agreement.
Defendant's Exhibits 14, 15.)

(R. 201-02;

Smedley was indebted to the bank

for an amount far in excess of the value of the drilling rig (R.
202) and worked with the bank to develop a plan to obtain the
equity in the drilling rig and apply it against Smedley's loan
with the bank.

(R. 279.)

The bank sent a notice to plaintiff

of its intention to dispose of the drilling rig, and asserted in
the notice that the amount necessary to redeem the collateral
was the outstanding principal and interest, together with costs
of repossession

and sale and attorney's

4

fees.

(Plaintiff's

Exhibit 7.)

In response to the notice, plaintiff submitted a

written tender offering to pay the amount of the principal and
interest to redeem the collateral.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 8.)

The bank did not respond to the tender.

(R. 202.)

The bank

proceeded with its sale, and at the sale, Smedley redeemed the
collateral for the amount demanded by the bank.

(R. 175, 178,

202.)
In accordance with his prior understanding with the bank,
Smedley thereafter sold the drilling rig to a third party and
paid the surplus proceeds from the sale to the bank for application against his outstanding indebtedness.

(R. 203.)

Neither

Smedley nor the bank gave any notice to plaintiff prior to the
sale by Smedley.
Plaintiff

(Id.)
filed

this

action

to

recover

damages

for

Smedley's and the bank's conversion of his property. (R. 85-94.)
Smedley filed an answer raising several affirmative defenses and
also claiming a right of setoff for the work he had performed on
the 200 acres of property.

(R. 106.)

The bank filed an answer

but did not assert a right to setoff in its answer.

(R. 95-

101.)
The jury found that both the bank and Smedley had converted
plaintiff's property.

The jury found plaintiff's damages by

reason of the conversion to be $30,586.

The jury further found

that Smedley had performed $20,139.00 worth of work on the 2 00
acres of property, and granted Smedley a setoff for that amount
and for the amount Smedley had paid to the bank on the GECC
5

note.

(R. 441.)

The jury, however, also granted the bank a

setoff for the same amounts.

(Id.; R. 483-85.)

thereafter perfected this appeal.

Plaintiff

(R. 490-91.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The jury found that the bank had converted
property

and

conversion
judgment,

were

the

damages

$30,586.00.

however,

another party.
tions.

that

and

caused

The

jury

indebtedness

to

plaintiff

setoff

owned

plaintiff's

by

by

against
plaintiff

the
that
to

The setoff was contrary to the jury instruc-

In addition, the setoff was contrary to law.

Setoffs

may only be allowed as between parties with a mutuality of
obligation.
The trial court also erred in failing to instruct the jury
of the issue of punitive damages.

The evidence presented to the

jury established, and the jury found, that the bank and Smedley
entered into a conspiracy to intentionally deprive plaintiff of
the equity in his property.

The conduct was wilful and mali-

cious, and an instruction on punitive damages should have been
given.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JURY AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN ALLOWING THE BANK A SETOFF FOR AN OBLIGATION
OWED TO SMEDLEY ONLY.
Plaintiff established at trial that the bank and Smedley
had agreed and conspired between themselves to deprive plaintiff
of its equity in the drilling rig and to apply that equity in
6

partial satisfaction of Smedley's obligation to the bank.

The

jury found the facts as contended by plaintiff, and awarded a
judgment against both Smedley and the bank for conversion.

The

jury determined plaintiff's damages from the conversion to be
$30,586.00, but then, in a hand-written addendum to its verdict,
proceeded to take away what it had given by allowing an improper
setoff against the judgment.
based

on an obligation

The jury allowed the bank a setoff

owed by plaintiff

to Smedley.

The

allowance of this setoff was contrary to the express instructions given to the jury, and also contrary to the established
law concerning the subject.
A.

The Jury Instructions Precluded Allowing a Setoff to

the Bank.
The

instructions to the jury regarding plaintiff's

claims against the bank are set forth predominately in instructions 29, 30, 31, and 36a, copies of which are set forth in the
appendix as Items C, D, E, and F, respectively.1

The measure of

damages against the bank was set forth in Instruction No. 31 as
follows:
In the event you find the bank has conspired
with Smedley has heretofore instructed, you
should also enter judgment against the bank
for the amount of any judgment against
Smedley for conversion or wrongful sale.
This instruction essentially provides that the bank and
Smedley would be jointly and severally liable for any damages

1

A complete list of the substantive jury instructions
(omitting the stock instructions) appears in Appendix G.

7

awarded to plaintiff for conversion.

In other words, the jury

could not find both Smedley and the bank guilty of conversion,
but find that plaintifffs damages as a result of the conversion
by the bank was "x" dollars, while plaintiff's damages as a
result of conversion by Smedley was "ylf dollars.
damages had to the same against each defendant.

The award of
Other instruc-

tions permitted the jury to grant Smedley a setoff for any
amounts which plaintiff owed Smedley. (E.g.. Instructions 24, 25
(R. 408-09).)

No instruction, however, authorized any setoff

against the damages found against the bank.
On the second page of its verdict (R. 440), the jury found
that plaintiff was entitled

to an award

Smedley in the sum of $30,586.00.

of damages against

Pursuant to the clear terms

of instruction No. 31, the jury was required, upon finding that
the bank participated

in the conversion,

to

find a verdict

against the bank in the same amount of $3 0,586.00.2

The case

should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter
judgment against the bank for the sum of $30,836.00.
B.

The

Bank

Was

Not

Entitled

to

a

Setoff

Based

on

Smedley's Claims Against Plaintiff.
Setoff
parties are each

is an equitable doctrine, allowed when two
indebted to the other on separate claims.

Under the circumstances, justice requires that the debts be

2

Pursuant to plaintiff's Motion for Judgment N.O.V., the
Court did grant an additur in the amount of $250.00, so the
amount of the judgment against Smedley and the bank should have
been $30,836.00. (R. 487).
8

setoff and only the difference between the debts recovered.
International Equipment Service, Inc. v. Pocatello Industrial
Park Co., 107 Idaho 1116, 695 P.2d 1255, 1258 (1985); 20 Am.
Jur. 2d Counterclaim, Recoupment, and Setoff § 7 (1965).

Setoff

is only allowed, however, where there is a mutuality of obligation.

First Security Bank of Utah v. Utah Turkey Growers, Inc.,

610 P.2d 329, 333 (Utah 1980).

Stated another way, a party may

not obtain the benefit of a setoff unless that party could have
maintained a direct action for the amount of the setoff.
v.

Tavco.

Inc.,

116 Utah

2d

323,

400

P.2d

503,

505

Seal
(1965)

(M[A]llowance of damages on a counterclaim by way of setoff is
tantamount to a suit on such cause of action."); Occidental
Chemical Co. v. Connor, 124 Ariz. 341, 604 P.2d 605, 607 (1979)
("If one is not entitled to relief in a direct action, he is not
entitled to assert a setoff or counterclaim.").
In the instant case, the setoff allowed to the bank was
based on the amounts which plaintiff owed to Smedley for work
Smedley had performed in development of the 200 acre parcel of
property.

The

claim

plaintiff and Smedley.

arose pursuant

to a contract

between

It is clear that the bank could not have

maintained

a direct

contract.

Where the bank could not have maintained a direct

action

against

action

plaintiff,

against

it

plaintiff

follows that

based

the bank

on that

is not

entitled to the benefit of setoff for that same obligation.
As set forth above, the instructions to the jury did not
allow the bank a right of setoff for the obligations owed by
9

plaintiff to Smedley.

To the extent that the instructions can

be read as allowing such a right of setoff, they are clearly
erroneous.

It is possible that the jury misunderstood

instructions.

the

It is clear in any event, however, that the jury

found that plaintiff was damaged in the amount of $30,586.00
(augmented

to

$30,836.00 pursuant

to plaintiff's Motion

for

Judgment N.O.V.), but then allowed the bank a setoff against
that amount based on claims owed by plaintiff to Smedley.
allowance

The

of the setoff was error, and the case should be

remanded for entry of judgment against the bank in the amount of
$30,836.00.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO AN INSTRUCTION
ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
Plaintiff's

amended

complaint

prayed

for

an

award

of

punitive damages (R. 94), and plaintiff requested that the jury
be instructed concerning punitive damages. (R. 336-37.)

The

trial

and

court

denied

plaintiff's

requested

instructions,

instructed the jury that no punitive damages could be awarded.
(R. 417.)
In order to give rise to punitive damages, a defendant's
conduct must be both wilful and malicious.

The defendant must

have demonstrated a knowing and reckless disregard toward the
rights of others.

Johnson v. Rogers, 90 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4

(1988)(citations omitted).

Plaintiff acknowledges that in order

to recover punitive damages, it was required to show more than
10

mere conversion.

Amoss v. Broadbent, 30 Utah 165, 514 P.2d 1284

(1973).
In the instant case, however, the jury found that the bank
had

converted

plaintiff's

property,

in

accordance

with

the

following instruction:
If you find for the plaintiff on either
plaintiff's claim for conversion or wrongful
sale, before you may find that the bank
conspired with Smedley you must find that
defendant Smedley and the bank entered into
a mutual agreement expressly or impliedly to
pursue a joint enterprise to convert the rig
or to conduct a wrongful sale of the rig in
which they both engaged. With both acting
in pursuit of that common purpose, so that
each is acting for both in furthering it.
Jury Instruction 30 (R. 414).
The jury

found,

therefore, that the bank

intentionally

entered into an agreement with Smedley for the express purpose
of wrongfully depriving plaintiff of his equity in the property.
This is sufficient to support an award of punitive damages, and
the jury should have been so instructed.
CONCLUSION
The instructions given to the jury and established case law
prohibit allowing the bank a setoff for amounts owed by plaintiff to Smedley.

The entry of the judgment allowing such a

setoff was in error.

This case should be remanded with instruc-

tions to enter a judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the
First National Bank of Lay ton in the sum of $30,836.00, plus
costs and interests as provided by law.

11

Plaintiff

was

entitled

to

an

instruction

on

punitive

damages, and the case should be remanded for a new trial on the
issue of punitive damages.
DATED this 9th day of November, 1988.

JACKSON HOWARD,
D. DAVID LAMBERT, and
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
tprneys for/Appellant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this
9th day of November, 1988.
DAVID E. BEAN
BEAN & SMEDLEY
190 South Fort Lane Suite 2
Layton, Utah 84041
WILLIAM THOMAS THURMAN
SCOTT C. PIERCE
MCKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
Kennecott Building Suite 1200
Salt Lake City^,—Utah 841?
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APPENDIX "A"
Jury Verdict (R.439-41)
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

- -
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C4<w u

SY

*°»«*^» CuUsr
/>£_

STATE OF UTAH

MARK VII FINANCIAL,
Civil Action No. 40864

Plaintiff,
!1

vs.

VERDICT

DALE SMEDLEY, and
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LAYTON, ]
Defendants.

]

WE THE JURY empanelled in the above entitled matter
Find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants Smedley and the Bank and award damages as follows:

5~2(*

Signed this

M

• . w.

I3E3 APR - 5 p!f \2: 3 0

IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY

1

^'

CDO

day of April, 1988.

V-J2^s>.CJ2,
Foreperson

FJLlWSD

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MARK VII FINANCIAL,

]
1

Civil Action No. 40864

Plaintiff,
vs.

'

VERDICT

DALE SMEDLEY, and
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LAYTON, ]
Defendants.

WE THE JURY empaneled in the above entitled matter,
Find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant Smedley and award damages in the following sum:

<W>c
U?b^ -&&&

-SS

«

->

Signed this

M

day of April, 1988.

V J ^ J ? S ,G&
Foreperson

<*o

3c^G"gl.—
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;
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APPENDIX "B"
Amended Judgment on the Verdict
(R. 483-85)

m

* 23

A
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JACKSON HOWARD, (A 1548) for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345

Our File No. 16,607

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MARK VII FINANCIAL CONSULTANTS
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED JUDGMENT
ON THE VERDICT

vs.

DALE SMEDLEY and FIRST NATIONAL
BANK OF LAYTON,
Defendants.

Civil No. 40864
Judge Rodney S. Page

The above-captioned matter came on for its regularly scheduled trial beginning
on March 30, 1988, continuing on April 1, and again continuing on April 4, 1988. The
Hon. Rodney S. Page presided over the trial, and the matter was tried to a duly
impaneled jury consisting of eight members.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the

jury was instructed on the law and thereafter, the jury received the arguments of
counsel.

The jury, through its foreperson, Michael S. Cole, returned its verdict and

based upon said verdict, and with the amendments the Court has made by separate
Order, the Court now makes and enters the following judgment on the verdict:

UCGSX'T EHB®

VLM

1.

The defendants jointly converted the property of the plaintiff damaging

the plaintiff as set forth hereafter.
2.

Damages were calculated against the bank and the defendant Smedley,

jointly and severally, for conversion as follows:

3.

a.

Value of property converted:

$ 35,000.00;

b.

Monies owed on the property:

($14,025.00);

c.

Offset for work performed by Smedley:

($20,139.00);

Total:

$

836.00.

In addition, the jury found damages against defendant Dale Smedley for

conversion in the sum of $30,836.00.
4.

The plaintiff is granted judgment against The First National Bank of

Layton in the amount of $836.00 and interest in the amount of $247.32 and costs in the
amount of $479.45.
5.

The plaintiff is granted judgment against Dale Smedley in the amount of

$30,836.00, plus interest in the amount of $11,691.98, attorney's fees in the amount of
$20,000.00, and costs in the amount of $479.45.
DATED at Farmington, Utah, this tt- day of June, 1988.
BY THE COURT:
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to
the following, postage prepaid, this

/™

day of June, 1987.

Scott Pierce
Attorney at Law
Kennecott Building #1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84113
David E. Bean
Attorney at Law
190 South Fort Lane #2
Lay ton, UT 84041
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APPENDIX "C"
I n s t r u c t i o n No. 29
(R. 413)

INSTRUCTION NO.

Ol

You are instructed that the Court has determined as
a matter of law that the bank did not conduct a private sale,
but rather, the action of Smedley in purchasing the drill rig
on April 29, 1985, was a redemption that did not cut off the
rights of Mark VII•

You are, therefore, instructed that if you

find that the bank at the time of the receipt of the money from
Doxey, May 3, 1985, knew that Smedley had redeemed as guarantor,
knew that he did not have' a right to sell the rig so as to
extinguish the interest of Mark VII and retain the proceeds.
Then the act of the bank in taking Doxey1s money and crediting
the account of Smedley was an act of conversion of the property
interest of Mark VII.

APPENDIX "D"
I n s t r u c t i o n No. 30
(R. 414)

INSTRUCTION NO.

3^

If you find for the plaintiff on either plaintiff's
claim for conversion or wrongful sale, before you may find that
the bank conspired with Smedley you must find that defendant
Smedley and the bank entered into a mutual agreement expressly
or impliedly to pursue a joint enterprise to convert the rig
or to conduct a wrongful sale of the rig in which they both
engaged.

With both acting in pursuit of that common purpose,

so that each is acting for both in furthering it.
The plaintiff must prove this proposition be a
preponderance of the evidence.

APPENDIX "E"
I n s t r u c t i o n No.
(R. 415)

31

INSTRUCTION NO.

Q\

In the event you find the bank has conspired with
Smedley as heretofore instructed, you should also enter judgment
against the bank for the amount of any judgment against Smedley
for conversion or wrongful sale.

APPENDIX "F"
I n s t r u c t i o n No.
(R. 421)

36a

INSTRUCTION NO.

3fa

You are instructed that you may find in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant Smedley and reach a verdict
consistant with these instructions.

You may also find in favor

of the plaintiff and against both defendants consistent with
these instructions so as to return two consistent verdicts in
favor of the plaintiff, however, if you find against Smedley in
both instances the amount of the joint verdict against both
Smedley and the Bank will be deducted by the Court from the
amount you award in the verdict form against Smedley alone so as
to prevent a double recovery.
Nothing contained herein requires that you do either or
both and you are instructed that you are free to return a verdict
as you see fit based upon the evidence and facts as you find them
under the law.

APPENDIX "G"
List of Substantive Jury Instructions

SUMMARY OF SUBSTANTIVE JURY INSTRUCTIONS
14.

Claims of the parties

15.

Written agreements are ambiguous

15a

Ambiguity construed against drafter

16.

Elements of breach of contract claim against Smedley

17.

Elements of conversion

18.

Smedley redeemed rig from Bank

19.

Requirements of commercially reasonable sale

20.

Elements of wrongful sale claim against Smedley

21.

Elements of Smedley's breach of agreement claim against plaintiff

22.

Smedley entitled to reasonable value of services

23.

Measure of damages for breach of contract against Smedley

24.

Measure of damages for conversion against Smedley

25.

Measure of damages for wrongful sale against Smedley

26.

Waiver and relinquishment defined

27.

Plaintiff had no duty to attend bank's sale

28.

Fair market value of rig was $33,000 plus $2,000 for hammer

29.

Elements of conversion against bank

30.

Elements of conspiracy against bank

31.

Measure of damages against bank (conspiracy to convert)

36a

Effect of verdicts against both bank and Smedley (double recovery)

